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Should Legal Malpractice Insurance Be
Mandatory?
As malpractice claims against lawyers multiply at an alarming rate, individual attorneys are becoming increasingly concerned about having to defend possible malpractice claims
against them and meeting the spiraling cost of legal malpractice
insurance. State bar associations and the American Bar Association are currently studying what can be done about the situation.'
As proposals to increase the availability and reduce the cost of
malpractice insurance have been explored, it has been suggested
that legal malpractice insurance coverage be required\as a necessary condition to the practice of 1aw.l
This Comment will explore background material on the
question of making legal malpractice insurance mandatory and
include responses to a questionnaire on legal malpractice insurance that was submitted to all state bar associations. Recent
relevant experiences of foreign and state bar associations will be
discussed, and arguments for and against a mandatory legal malpractice insurance proposal will be examined. In addition, the
possible effects and problems of a mandatory program will be
considered.

A review of the establishment of clients' security funds is an
appropriate starting point for a discussion of mandatory legal
malpractice insurance for two reasons: (1)clients' security funds
were designed to complement legal malpractice insurance coverage, and (2) the arguments for and against clients' security funds
and mandatory legal malpractice insurance are similar. Since
1959, state and local bar associations have established funds to
compensate clients for the dishonest acts of their attorney^.^
Some of these funds are financed by mandatory contributions
from all association members. Others are funded voluntarily. Although forty-eight states and the District of Columbia currently
1. See Jericho & Coultas, Are Lawyers an Insurable Risk?, 63 A.B.A.J. 832, 835-36
(1977); Woytash, Lawyer Malpractice: Is a Crisis Coming?, B. LEADER,
Oct. 1976, at 18.
2. See W. Gates, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers (Feb. 21, 1975)
(paper presented at the meeting of the National Conference of Bar Presidents) (Gates is
chairman of the ABA Special Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability).
3. Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years Later, 55 A.B.A.J. 757, 757 (1969).
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have such funds,4 opinions originally were strongly divided over
the wisdom of their establishment.
Attorneys favoring the establishment of clients' security
funds saw meeting a moral obligation to the public and the profession as a primary reason for the funds? Such a fund, it was
argued, was necessary in order to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the pr~fession.~
Moreover, it was contended that a clients' security fund would improve the bar's reputation by compensating
clients for their lawyers' dishonesty.' A third reason given was
that the bar's failure to recognize its responsibility to the public
in this area would result in public pressure toward legislation for
such protecti~n.~
Commentators opposing clients' security funds replied that
attorneys had no duty to pay for the defalcations of other lawy e r s . T h y should honest lawyers pay for the acts of dishonest
attorneys? It would be better, these commentators argued, for the
bar to use its energies in screening those admitted to the b a d 0
The existence and operation of the funds arguably would publicize the dishonesty of lawyers and worsen public relations?
Charges that such plans were unnecessary12and would result in
added expense to individual lawyers were also made.13Moreover,
the availability of such plans would possibly increase both dishonesty charges against members of the bar and actions for malpractice. l 4
As evidenced by the overwhelming number of states that
have adopted clients' security funds, it is apparent that the legal
profession was more persuaded by the arguments favoring the
funds' establishment. Although many of the same arguments
4. Telephone interview with James H. Bradner, Assistant Director, Center for Professional Discipline, American Bar Association (Sept. 15, 1977) (notes on file in the officeof
the Brigham Young University Law Review).
5. See, e.g., Smith, The Client's Security Fund: "A Debt of Honor Owed by the
Profession", 44 A.B.A. J. 125 (1958); Sterling, The Argument for a Clients' Security Fund,
36 CAL.ST. B.J. 957, 957 (1961); Voorhees, The Case for a Clients' Security Fund, 42 J.
AM. JUD.
SOC'Y155, 157 (1959).
6. See, e.g., Atkins & Kane, Clients' Security Fund Maintains Bar's Integrity, 44 FLA.
B.J. 130, 132 (1970); Scott, Some Pros and Cons of the Client Security Fund Proposal, 22
THESHINGLE
17, 18 (1959).
7. Sterling, supra note 5, at 958.
8. Id. at 959.
9. See, e.g., McKnight, The Argument Against Clients' Security Fund, 36 CAL.ST.
B.J. 963 (1961); Scott, supra note 6, a t 18.
10. McKnight, supra note 9, at 963.
11. See id. at 964.
12. See Sterling, supra note 5, at 959.
13. McKnight, supra note 9, at 966.
14. Id. at 965.
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apply equally to the question of mandatory malpractice insurance, it is important to note that clients' security funds were not
established to cover lawyer negligence as does malpractice insurance but rather to compensate for attorney defalcations. John W.
Bryan, Jr., former chairman of the Louisiana and ABA committees on clients' security funds, has made this clear:
The Clients Security Fund is not a substitute for professional
liability insurance as it does not cover negligence which is the
risk insured against by the lawyer under the so called malpractice policy.
Clients of lawyers with professional liability policies have
no rights against the policy carrier because the standard form
of policy excepts defalcation. The Clients Security Fund is a
supplement to the malpractice insurance except that itis not in
the nature of insurance but is a fund available for payments
approved by the committee purely as a matter of grace and not
of legal obligation either of the fund or the bar association.15

Bryan's observation makes it evident that clients' security
funds were designed to complement legal malpractice insurance
coverage. Bryan has emphasized this interrelationship and the
need for mandatory legal malpractice insurance to complete the
security of the client:
The theory of both the American and British funds is that a
client is relegated to the malpractice insurance of the lawyer or
to the lawyer's own resources in the case of the negligent handling of a client's matter as distinguished from a defalcation.
It may be that some lawyers do not have this coverage. This
insurance should be made compulsory as a condition of the privilege of practicing law and as a way of completing the security
of the client. l6

Theoretically, then, a client would be protected from an attorney's negligence by legal malpractice insurance and from defalcations by a clients' security fund. Unfortunately, this ideal of complete protection has not yet been realized.

Although nearly all state bar associations have provided protection against a lawyer's defalcations with a clients' security
fund, there is none that presently requires malpractice insur15. Bryan, The Clients Security Fund in Louisiana-A Status Report, 16 LA. B.J.
141, 145 n.3 (1968).
16. Bryan, supra note 3, at 760.
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ance.17 I t is likely that as the number of malpractice claims
against lawyers increase, especially against uninsured attorneys,
state bar associations in the near future will give greater attention
to the question of mandatory legal malpractice insurance. To
ascertain the current opinions of state bar associations on the
question of mandatory legal malpractice insurance and other related issues, a questionnaire entitled "Yes-No Questions on Legal
Malpractice Insurance" was sent to the executive directors of all
state bar associations on September 27, 1977. In states that had
both a voluntary and a unified bar,18 the questionnaire was sent
only to the unified bar. Forty-seven of the fifty state bar associations responded.I9 The results of the survey are summarized as
follows:20
Questions

Is your bar association in
favor of mandatory legal
malpractice insurance ?
a. members of the bar generally
b. members of the governing
board

Number of Responses
Don't
Yes
No
Know

No
Response

4

10

32

1

7

11

26

3

3

1

4

8

Does your bar association
sponsor a legal malpractice
insurance program ?

42

5

--

0

Does your bar association
have any plans to become
self-insuring ?

2221

19

5

1

Does your bar association predict t h a t mandatory legal malpractice insurance will significantly increase malpractice
claims against attorneys ?
a. members of the bar generally
b. members of the governing
board

17. Oregon will require legal malpractice insurance on July 1, 1978. See notes 49-53
and accompanying text infra.
18. North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. See AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION,
1977/78 D~RECTORY
3G-5G (1977).
19. The bar associations of Minnesota, New Mexico, and Oklahoma did not respond.
20. The Review gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Larry C.Farmer, Rodney
Jackson, and Gerald R. Williams in the preparation of the questionnaire and in the
compilation of the responses.
21. "Yes" answers include nine responses such as "studying self-insurance," etc.
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5. Does your bar association
have a clients' security fund?
If yes, are you satisfied
with your clients' security
fund ?
Are contributions to your
clients' security fund
mandatory ?

44z2

34

3423

Company
Which insurance companies
underwrite legal malpractice
insurance in your state?

American Home Assurance
Company
American Bankers Insurance Company of
Florida
St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company
Continental Casualty
Company (CNA)
Lloyd's of London
GATX Insurance Con~pany
Gulf Insurance Company
Phoenix Insurance Company
Transamerica Insurance
.
Group
Percent

Approximately what percentage
of your attorneys are covered
by legal malpractice insurance ? 2 4

[1978:

Nunlber
of
Responses
26

22
8
3
2
1
1
1

1

Nunlber

0-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79
80-85
No Response

The large number of "Don't Know" responses to questions 1
and 2 suggests a surprising lack of research and policy formulation concerning legal malpractice insurance. Many state bars
22. "Yes" answers include cases where the clients' security fund is administered by
the state supreme court rather than by the bar.
23. "Yes" answers include cases where part of an attorney's dues or part of the bar
budget goes to support the clients' security fund.
24. Using the estimates provided by the state bar executive directors and the number
1976-1977 DIRECTORY
OF BARASSOCIATIONS
of attorneys given in AMERICANBARASSOCIATION,
(1976), it is estimated that 55.42% of the attorneys in the 35 states responding carry
malpractice insurance (149,190 out of 269,214). There is no external source to validate this
estimate. An article published in 1970 cites various national estimates ranging from below
50% to above 90%.Denenberg, Ehre, & Huling, Lawyers' Professional Liability Insurance:
The Peril, the Protection, and the Price, INS.
L.J., July 1970, at 392.
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apparently have not yet confronted the issue of mandatory malpractice insurance. Of the bar associations which answered either
yes or no to question 1, there was a split of opinion between the
governing boards, with more opposing than favoring mandatory
insurance. According to the estimates of the executive directors,
bars with members generally opposing mandatory insurance outnumbered bars with members generally favoring such a proposal
by more than two to one. When coupled with the finding that
fewer than fifty-six percent25of all attorneys have malpractice
insurance, it appears t h a t many attorneys prefer the risk of
"going bare" to the cost of either voluntary or mandatory insurance.
Although there were many "Don't Know" responses to the
questionnaire, certain correlations that can be inferred from the
survey results help suggest why a particular bar association would
be in favor of or opposed to mandatory insurance. One informative relationship is that between bar size and support for or opposition to mandatory insurance. This correlation is shown in Table
1.
TABLE1.-Attitudes
of Bar m e m b e r s and governing boards toward
m a n d a t o r y legal malpractice insurance a s a fzcnction. of b a r size
Bar Members
Bar Size

"

0-2000
2000-5000
5000-10,000
over 10,000
Total

Governing Boards

Favoring Opposing No Opinion

0
1

-

5
1
3
1

-

8
10
6
8
-

4

10

32

1
2

5

Favoring Opposing No Opinion

-

3
0

-

5
8
6
7

7

11

26

2
2
1
2

6
2

As Table 1 indicates, attorneys in bars with less than 2000 members reportedly are generally opposed to the idea of mandatory
insurance. The least opposition and strongest support for mandatory insurance was reported among lawyers in bars with memberships over 10,000. By contrast, bar size was not as closely related
to the governing boards' support for mandatory insurance as it
was to the reported general opinions of bar members. Governing
25. See note 24 supra.
26. This category was based on the number of attorneys given in AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION,
note 24 supra.
27. The "No Opinion" category of Tables 1, 3, and 5 includes only "Don't Know"
responses.
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board opposition to mandatory insurance, however, was inversely
related to bar size.
The correlation between bar size and membership support
for mandatory insurance may be the result of two factors. First,
insurance administration costs and underwriting losses in a large
bar can be distributed over a larger base, making mandatory
insurance more feasible. Second, a bar association's ability to
recognize intrinsic problems and to devise solutions may be related to bar size. In showing a high correlation between bar size
and associations with plans to become self-insuring, other survey
results, set out in Table 2, partially support this latter assertion.28
TABLE2 . - ~ u k b e r of b a r associations with plans to become selfinsuring a s a function of b a r size
B a r Size

B a r s with plans

B a r s without plans

2)

0-2000
2000-5000
5000-10,000
over 10,000
Total

Almost seventy-three percent" of the bars with memberships over
10,000 reported plans to become self-insuring; less than eight
percent3' of the bars with less than 2000 members reported selfinsurance plans.
A correlation, similar to that between bar size and support
for mandatory insurance, may also be seen between bar type
(unified, voluntary, or partially unified) and support for mandatory insurance. As Table 3 shows, members of nearly fourteen
percent of the twenty-nine unified bars reporting members' opinions were generally in favor of requiring legal malpractice insurance. The members of no voluntary bars were reported as generally favoring mandatory insurance.
28. This assumes, of course, that having a plan to become self-insuring demonstrates
a bar's "ability to recognize intrinsic problems and to devise solutions."
29. The "Bars without plans" category of Tables 2, 4, and 5 does not include cases
where either a "Don't Know" or no response was made to the question.
30. Of 11 bars with memberships over 10,000, eight reported plans to become selfinsuring.
31. Only one bar association (Idaho) out of 13 bars with memberships under 2000
reported plans to become self-insuring.
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TABLE 3.-Attitudes o f b a r m e m b e r s and governing bourds toward
mandatory legal malpractice insurance a s a function of bar t y p e
Bar Members
B a r Type :Z
Unified
Voluntary
Partially Unified
Total

Governing Boards

No
hTo
Favoring Opposing Opinion Favoring Opposing Opinion
4
0
0

4

6
3

19
13

7
0

1

0
--

0
-

-

-

32

7

11

26

7

10

6
4
1

14
12
0

Table 3 also shows that among the governing boards of unified
bars almost the same number of boards support the idea of mandatory insurance as reportedly oppose it. No voluntary bar governing boards, however, were reported as favoring a mandatory
program.
One possible reason why neither the general memberships
nor the governing boards of voluntary associations were reported
in favor of mandatory insurance is the fact that a mandatory
program is rather impractical where membership is on a voluntary basis? A voluntary bar's governing board has little power to
coerce the association's members to participate in a mandatory
program. Such a program could also decrease new memberships
in a voluntary bar.
Another pattern derivable from the survey data is the relationship between bar type and a bar's plans to become selfinsuring. This correlation is shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4.-Number
o f b a r associatio.m with plans to become selfinszcring a s a function o f b a r t y p e
B a r Type

Bars with plans

Bars without plans

-

Unified
Voluntary
Partially Unified
Total

32. Classification of type of bar was based on AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION,
supra note
18, at 1G-5G.
33. Illinois State Bar Association reply to questionnaire. All responses to the questionnaire are on file in the office of the Brigham Young University Law Review.
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As Table 4 indicates, of the bar associations reporting plans to
become self-insuring, nearly seventy-three percent are unified
bars. The near-even split among voluntary bars over selfinsurance plans may again be explained by the lack of power of
voluntary bar governing boards to require membership participation.
The survey results indicate that bars with plans to become
self-insuring are more likely to favor mandatory malpractice insurance. If a bar plans to self-insure, there must be a fairly large
number of participants to make the program feasible." In light
of the correlation between bar size and reported membership support for mandatory insurance, it is not surprising then that those
bars considering self-insurance would also be likely to favor mandatory participation. Table 5 shows this result.
TABLE 5.-Number of bar associations w i t h plans to become selfinsuring as a function of the attitudes of bar members and governing
boards toward mandatory legal malpractice insurance
Attitudes toward mandatory insurance

Bars with plans

Bars without plans

Bar Members
Favoring
Opposing
No Opinion
Total
Governing Boards
Favoring
Opposing
No Opinion
Total

The survey also showed that bars requiring contributions to
their clients' security funds were much more likely to be satisfied
with those funds than were bars with voluntary-participation
funds. Of the bars responding to the question on satisfaction with
clients' security funds, nearly eighty-five percent of the bars with
mandatory programs were satisfied; by way of contrast, only sixty
percent of those bars with voluntary programs were satisfied.
These results are shown in Table 6.
34. To the extent that feasability of a self-insurance program is reflected in the plans
of a bar association, this assertion is supported by the survey results in Table 2. See text
accompanying note 28 supra.
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TABLE6.-Number of bar associations satisfied with their clie~lts'
security funds as a function of the type of contribut.ion to clients'
security fund
-

Type of contribution

Bar satisfied

-

Bar not satisfied

Mandatory
Voluntary
Total 35

To the extent that satisfaction indicates success, the success of a
clients' security fund apparently may be dependent on whether
contributions to the fund are required.36This dependency suggests that a malpractice insurance program to be successful
would also need to be mandatory. This would be especially true
where a bar self-insures because of the necessity of having a sufficient base over which to spread the risks. In light of the low
percentage of attorneys presently either carrying malpractice insurance or favoring the institution of mandatory insurance, it is
unlikely that a voluntary program of bar-sponsored insurance
would gain sufficient support to be successful.
The fact that there were so many "Don't Know" responses
to the questionnaire suggests a greater need for exploration of
the legal malpractice insurance problem. Considerable current
awareness of the mandatory insurance proposal, however, is
indicated by the fact that eighteen state bar executive directors
gave definite responses to the survey question regarding bar governing board support for or opposition to the proposal. Although
increased interest and research in this area are likely, it is difficult to predict whether the result will be adoption or rejection of
mandatory programs.
III. RECENT
EXPERIENCES
IN MANDATORY
LEGALMALPRACTICE

INSURANCE
Although relatively few state bar associations are in favor of
mandatory malpractice insurance, three states have attempted to
adopt mandatory programs; one state bar has succeeded. In addition, some foreign bar associations have required attorneys to
-

-

35. Four bars did not respond to the question regarding satisfaction with clients'
security funds.
36. See Amster, Clients' Security Funds: The New Jersey Story, 62 A.B.A.J. 1610,
1610 (1976).
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obtain legal malpractice insurance coverage. This section reviews
the experiences of these foreign and state bars.

A. British Columbia37
Faced with dramatic increases in the cost of legal malpractice insurance, the Law Society of British Columbia developed a
program to obtain insurance coverage for its members a t reasonable rates. The Society had as its primary purpose the protection
of its members. It realized, however, that the public would also
be protected if every attorney was adequately insured.
The Society recognized that, in order to implement and control a malpractice insurance program, more was necessary than
merely requiring each attorney to obtain malpractice coverage.
Because the refusal of insurance companies to insure an attorney
would bar him from practicing law, merely requiring each Society
member to carry malpractice coverage would be equivalent to
placing the power of deciding who would practice law in the
hands of private insurance companies. In response to this problem, the Society implemented a mandatory program38under
which all members would be insured by one insurer, but within
which the Law Society and not the insurer would decide who was
to be exempted or excluded.
The program is partially self-insured, with the Law Society
and the insured attorney jointly paying the first portion of every
claim. The policy limit is $100,00039per claim. Of this amount,
each member pays a $3000 deductible per claim. The Society
then pays the next $22,000 (in essence a $25,000 deductible to the
insurer), and the insurer pays the remaining $75,000. The Society's losses in any policy year are limited to $500,000. Any losses
in excess of this limit are paid by the insurer regardless of the
amount .*
The program provides malpractice coverage to all the So37. The information in this section is based on a letter from and telephone interview
with T.V. McCallum, Secretary of the Law Society of British Columbia. Letter from T.V.
McCallum to Thomas L. Kay (Oct. 14, 1977) (on file in the office of the Brigham Young
University Law Review); telephone interview with T.V. McCallum (Oct. 19, 1977) (notes
on file).
38. The Canadian law societies have far more power to implement programs than do
their American counterparts. They need no judicial or legislative approval to put a plan
such as mandatory insurance into effect. Telephone interview with T.V. McCallum (Oct.
19, 1977) (notes on file in the office of the Brigham Young University Law Review).
39. All dollar amounts in this section are in Canadian currency.
40. The insured attorney must still pay the first $3000 of each claim, however. Telephone interview with T.V. McCallum (Feb. 20, 1978) (notes on file in the office of the
Brigham Young University Law Review).
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ciety's members at a very reasonable cost. Before the program
went into effect on January 1, 1971, with Travelers Insurance
Companies as the carrier, only forty percent of the Society's
members had malpractice coverage. Today, except for those who
are exempted from the insurance requirement, such as government and corporation employees, each member of the Society has
$100,000 per claim coverage for $300 per yeard1Out of this $300
assessment, the Law Society pays both the program's operating
costs and the insurer's premiumd2and covers the $500,000 loss
limit.
The Society's involvement in the program, both in a financial sense and through an active loss prevention program, demonstrates to the insurer that the Society and its members take a
strong interest in the viability of the insurance program. The
Society's involvement has made it possible to identify the sources
of claims and to implement effective loss prevention measures.
For example, after finding that thirty-three percent of all claims
(fifty percent in dollar figures) arose from statute of limitations
problems, especially the one-year statute of limitations of British
Columbia's motor vehicle act, the Law Society devised and marketed a diary system that could be implemented in each law
office. The Society also lobbied to increase the motor vehicle act
statute of limitations period from one year to two years. Another
thirty percent of claims were found to come from title search
problems. In response to this problem, the Society developed a
title search form for its members. Problems with mechanic's liens
constituted the third largest number of claims. The Society has
warned its members against the pitfalls of the mechanic's lien act
and has also lobbied for its change.
In addition to mandatory insurance, the Law Society has a
Special Fund, equivalent to a clients' security fund, that reimburses clients for the dishonest acts of their lawyers. The Society
has noted an improvement in its public image since the adoption
of the Special Fund and mandatory insurance. The public is now
assured that no client will be unprotected. Knowledge of the insurance requirement by the public and by attorneys, however,
has apparently led to an increase in the number of malpractice
claims. This increase may also be explained by the fact that some
-

-

-

41. Additional coverage can be obtained for a modest cost. For example, an extra
$900,000 coverage over the $100,000 mandatory limit would cost $160 per year. Thus,
$1,000,000 of coverage would cost $460 per year.
42. Since 1976 the insurer has been GESTAS, a Canadian consortium of eight insurance companies operating out of Montreal.
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lawyers may have become more careless in their practice because
they know they are covered by insurance.43
The British Columbia Law Society feels that its program has
been very successful on the whole. Nonexempt members and their
clients are protected for what is reported to be one-sixth to oneseventh the cost of equivalent, individually acquired coverage
written by a commercial carrier. Because of the success of the
British Columbia program, nine of the ten other Canadian law
societies have adopted similar mandatory programs.44

The Norwegian Clients' Compensation Fund encompasses
coverage for both malpractice and dishonesty. Established by the
Norwegian Bar Association (Den Norske Advokatforening) in
1969, the fund is, in effect, a combined malpractice insurance
program and clients' security fund. The fund is controlled by a
council of three members, two appointed by Den Norske Advokatforening and one appointed by the Ministry of Justice. The
program, administered by the Secretariat of Den Norske Advokatforening, requires each lawyer to contribute approximately
$40 per year.
The fund is to be used in the council's discretion to cover any
liability that a lawyer may incur as a result of his own or his firm's
illegal conduct in the course of professional activities. Claims due
to negligence may also be met by this fund. In order to be granted
any compensation from the council, however, the client must first
establish in court the attorney's liability for the dishonest or negligent act. After establishing the legal basis for the claim, the
client may apply to the council for compensation. The council
then determines the amount of compensation to be paid, if any.
Generally, full compensation will be paid if the fund has the
means to do so. The council's decisions are final and cannot be
appealed in the courts. After compensating the client, the fund
has the right to make a claim against the lawyer concerned.
43. The first $3000 of each claim must still be paid by the insured lawyer, however.
44. The Bar of Quebec has not adopted a mandatory program. Telephone interview
with T.V. McCallum (Feb. 20, 1978) (notes on file in the office of the Brigham Young

University Law Review). Reportedly, the programs adopted by the other nine law societies
(including the one established by the Chamber of Notaries in Quebec) have experienced
results similar to those of British Columbia. Telephone interview with T.V. McCallum
(Oct. 19, 1977) (notes on file).
45. The information in this section is based on a letter from Kristen S. Fari, Secretary
of Den Norske Advokatforening. Letter from Kristen S. Fari to Thomas L. Kay (Sept. 20,
1977) (on file in the office of the Brigham Young University Law Review).
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Washington was apparently the first state to consider implementation of a mandatory malpractice insurance program. In
1973, the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar made
a firm decision to institute such a program. A poll that year of
the bar's membership had shown that seventy-two percent of
those attorneys responding were in favor of the idea of mandatory
malpractice insurance. The local bar presidents approved the
idea in 1974 and urged its implementation. The State Bar Insurance Committee, however, was neither willing nor prepared to
effectively implement the program a t that time.
The Board of Governors instead instructed the bar staff to
explore the alternatives available in the market place. Many insurance brokers made presentations to the staff. Some brokers
had fully developed plans; others suggested that the Board of
Governors select an experienced broker and then take some time
to develop specifications before signing up a carrier. The Board
decided to take the latter approach.
A Board committee was formed and, together with a broker,
developed a plan that was later accepted by the Argonaut Insurance Company. The plan's essential elements were announced to
the bar in August 1974. The program was to provide $1,000,000
coverage, with no deductible, for an annual premium of $155. The
policy year and mandatory requirement were to begin on February 1, 1975. The policy, an "occurrence" and not a "claims made"
type," would not have given the insurer the right of individual
cancellation. The insurer was committed to underwrite the program for two additional years with no more than a ten percent
premium increase.
In conjunction with this announcement, the Board of Governors recommended that the Washington Supreme Court adopt a
new rule requiring malpractice insurance coverage as a condition
of practicing law. Bylaws were also established to make the program effective February 1, 1975, and to exempt certain attorneys
from the insurance requirement. Those opposing the program
made presentations to the court. One large county bar association
46. The information in this section is based on that in W. Gates, note 2 supra.
47. An "occurence" type of policy covers acts, errors, or omissions committed during
the policy period regardless of when the claim is made. A "claims made" type of policy,
by contrast, covers acts, errors, or omissions for claims presented during the policy period.
For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these two types of policies, see
R. MALLEN
& V. LEVIT,LEGALMALPRACTICE
g g 459-460 (1977); Comment, The "Claims
Made" Dilemma i n Professional Liability Insurance, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV.925 (1975).
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adopted a resolution opposing the program.
Before the debate could be resolved, however, a death blow
was struck to the program when, in late October 1974, Argonaut
was forced to withdraw because its parent corporation, Teledyne,
had suffered enormous underwriting and investment losses. As a
result, the mandatory program had to be postponed. The Washington Supreme Court was requested to defer its action on the
proposed rule. A second poll was then conducted to determine the
feelings of the bar's membership. Of the 2,830 attorneys who
responded (out of 6,000 members), sixty-three percent were in
favor of requiring legal malpractice insurance; however, only
forty-two percent wanted the Board of Governors to continue its
efforts to develop a compulsory insurance contract with a single
carrier. Presently the Washington State Bar Association is considering the possibility of self-insurance?

The Oregon State Bar has gone further than any other state
bar association in implementing a mandatory legal malpractice
insurance program. At their 1976 annual meeting, the members
of the bar voted to authorize the Board of Governors to seek
legislation authorizing a compulsory liability fund. The bill
drafted and sponsored by the Board, Senate Bill 190, was passed
by the Oregon Legislature and signed into law by Governor
Straub in mid-1977. The new law authorizes the Board of Governors "to require all active members of the state bar engaged in
the private practice of law in Oregon to carry professional liability
insurance . . . ."50
The Board responded to the law's enactment by adopting a
resolution establishing the Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund. The resolution requires "all active members of the Oregon State Bar engaged in the private practice of law" to carry,
beginning July 1, 1978, "professional liability coverage with aggregate limits of not less than $100,000"51that will be offered by
the Professional Liability Fund. The fund, to be managed by a
Board of Directors consisting of seven active members of the Oregon State Bar engaged in private practice and appointed by the
Board of Governors, will evaluate, investigate, negotiate, and de48. WASH.ST. B. NEWS,
June 1977, at 19.
49. The information in this section is largely based on Statement of the Board of
Governors, Oregon State Bar, Professional Liability Fund (1977 Annual Meeting).
50. ORE.REV. STAT.9 9.080(1) (1977).
51. Statement of the Board of Governors, supra note 49, at 8.
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fend claims. The initial assessment for the period from July 1
through December 31, 1978, will be $250 per lawyer. New lawyers
admitted to practice after September 1, 1977, will be assessed
$125. Coverage will be on a "claims made" basis with a $100,000
limit on all claims arising out of the same act, subject to a maximum liability of $200,000 per coverage period. House counsel,
public defenders, legal aid lawyers, and government attorneys
. ~ ~addition,
will be excluded from the insurance r e q ~ i r e m e n t In
patent lawyers will be required to furnish evidence of comparable
coverage with a private carrier, although they will not be required
to subscribe to the fund.
The Oregon Bar anticipates that the plan will produce
greater protection of the clients and the public, greater protection
for the lawyer, and continued availability of professional liability
protection a t a reduced cost.53The absence of a profit factor and
the utilization of a detailed recordkeeping system and loss prevention program should result in the Professional Liability Fund
costing attorneys far less than comparable commercial insurance.
Other reasons for reduced costs are the elimination of advertising
costs and brokers' commissions, the elimination of unnecessarily
large accumulations of reserves, and broad participation by all
attorneys to spread the costs.
The experience of the Oregon State Bar in the future will be
helpful to other state bar associations in formulating their own
mandatory insurance programs. The success of the Oregon program is likely to influence other bars to implement mandatory
self-insurance programs. Under a program like Oregon's Professional Liability Fund, mandatory coverage will be necessary to
provide an adequate base over which to spread the risks.

E. California
California, like Oregon, attempted to create an alternative to
private insurance. However, where Oregon succeeded, California
failed. California's attempt came in the form of a bill sponsored
in the state legislature by Assemblyman John T. K n ~ x . ~ ~ n o x ' s
Assembly Bill 209 was designed to offer relief from the high cost
of malpractice insurance by establishing the California Client
Protection Fund, a public corporation that would exist within the
52. See ORE.REV.STAT.F) 9.080(4) (1977).
Aug. 1977, at 6.
53. ORE.ST. B. BULL.,
54. See Knox,A. B. 209: "Alternative to Private Insurance", STATEB. CAL.REP.,July
1977, a t 1, 4.
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state's judicial branch of government. This fund was to be maintained by requiring yearly contributions from the bar. Unlike
private insurance, most of which is written on a "claims made"
basis, contributions would be based on the amount paid out to
clients in the previous year. This "claims paid" formula was a
unique idea to professional liability coverage. The first-year
(1978) contribution was to be $400 per attorney. The limit of
coverage was to be $250,000 per occurrence, with an aggregate
total of $500,000 per contribution period.
Knox's bill sparked a vigorous debate among California attorneys. Knox's supporters, seeing no reasonable alternative to
the proposal, viewed the reduced cost to attorneys and the increased public protection as primary reasons for adopting the
proposed legislation. The fund should be mandatory, these supporters argued, because it would be unconscionable to allow an
attorney to practice without providing for his clients' financial
security.55
The bill's opponents argued that the plan was being sold on
the basis of an artifically low initial contribution. They viewed
the "claims paid" structure as being financially unsound. Such
a fund, incorporating an extreme cost deferral, has the potential
for weakening the legal profession and subjecting it to ultimate
state control, they said. Opponents also contended that mandatory participation was undesirable because it forced a lawyer into
an "untried social experiment." Other, superior alternatives were
said to be available a t comparable overall costs?
Assemblyman Knox finally withdrew the proposed Client
Protection Fund provision from the bill and converted it into a
proposal for a special study of attorney malpractice and client
protection. This action came after the Los Angeles and San Diego
county bar associations voiced their opposition to the bill and
after a statewide attorney plebiscite conducted by the state bar
showed that only a slim majority supported the proposal.57Thus
diluted, the bill was passed by the California Legislature, but was
vetoed by Governor Brown on October 3,1977. Brown's veto message stated that the bill "contemplates compulsory insurance for
one professional group. Compulsory insurance inevitably leads to
a state fund, a prospect we should think about long and hard."58
55. Cotkin, Arguments for A.B. 209-Attorneys Professional Responsibility Fund,
STATEB. CAL.REP.,July 1977, at 7.
56. Miller, Arguments Against A.B. 209-Attorneys Professional Responsibility
B. CAL.REP.,July 1977, at 5.
Fund, STATE
57. STATEB. CAL.REP.,Aug. 1977, at 1.
58. Press Release from Office of the Governor of California (Oct. 3, 1977) (quoted in
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IV. THEARGUMENTS
Considering the many state bar associations that have apparently not yet decided to support or oppose the mandatory legal
malpractice insurance proposal, a review and analysis of the arguments for and against such a proposal may be valuable. The
following arguments will deal mainly with mandatory proposals
with one insurer or with self-insurance.59

A. Financial Protection of Clients and Attorneys
As has been noted above,60legal malpractice insurance completes a client's protection when coupled with an existing clients'
security fund. Although it may be unconscionable for a lawyer to
practice law without first providing financial security for his
clients," many lawyers have chosen to "go bare.'' It is estimated
that less than fifty-six percent of all attorneys have malpractice
i n s ~ r a n c eWhen
. ~ ~ large numbers of attorneys choose not to provide for their clients' protection, the bar arguably should require
that all lawyers obtain insurance coverage as a privilege of practicing law.
Opponents may argue that there are few unsatisfied malpractice claims against lawyers and that a mandatory program
should not be imposed where there has been no significant problem. Although unsatisfied claims against lawyers are not yet a
matter of general public attention, bar associations need not
await "scandal or public outcry" before bringing about needed
reform.63Requiring attorneys to obtain malpractice coverage
would assure that no client would go without a remedy for an
attorney's negligence.
Requiring malpractice insurance would not only provide financial security to the client but would also protect the attorney.
Lawyers engaged in private practice without malpractice insurance risk financial disaster from even a minor inadvertence?If
STATEB. CAI.. REP.,O d . 1977, a t 14).
59. Some of the following arguments would be somewhat different if, rather than a
mandatory self-insurance or sole-insurer program, there was merely an insurance requirement for all attorneys. Requiring all attorneys to obtain insurance might induce more
companies to write legal malpractice insurance policies, thus increasing the number of
insurers from which lawyers might choose. An increased number of competing insurance
companies soliciting business might arguably result in a reduction in the cost of insurance.
60. Notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
61. Cotkin, supra note 55, at 8.
62. Note 24 supra.
63. W. Gates, supra note 2, a t 2.
64. Neil, A Realistic Response to the Professional Liability Insurance Problem, ORE.
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the attorney's financial protection were the only consideration,
the bar might have no responsibility to require that all lawyers
carry malpractice insurance. When coupled with the bar's responsibility to protect the public, however, the protection of the
bar's members further justifies implementation of a mandatory
program.

B. Cost
Any consideration of a proposal to remedy the existing malpractice insurance situation must deal with the proposal's effect
on the cost of insurance? If a mandatory program is more expensive then existing insurance, the proposal will obviously be far
more difficult to adopt. By contrast, a mandatory program less
expensive than existing insurance alternatives would come as a
welcome relief to the present state of soaring insurance premiums.
Proponents of mandatory insurance argue that a mandatory
program will reduce the cost of malpractice coverage. The increase in the number of attorneys insured will spread the risk over
a broader base and thus arguably reduce the cost? Opponents
contend that the inclusion of lawyers presently uninsured in the
base will not necessarily reduce the cost. It is possible that the
lawyers without insurance are actually those most prone to malpractice claims because they are poor risks and cannot afford the
resulting high premiums. Requiring these lawyers to have insurance, opponents argue, will make premiums even higher because
there will be an increase in the number of claims that will outweigh the advantage of a larger base of insureds.
There are other reasons why coverage should cost less under
a mandatory program, however. Administration of a mandatory
program would yield information about the sources and causes of
malpractice claims. That information could be used to implement loss prevention programs that would have the longrun effect
of decreasing the number of claims made?' States that adopt a
professional liability fund, such as Oregon's self-insurance plan,
ST.B. BULL.,
Mar. 1977, at 5. See also Dixon, 'Going Bare' May Be Hazardous to Your
MED.,
Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 23.
Fiscal Health, J . LEGAL
65. This section will deal only with the cost of insurance to attorneys. Arguably, the
cost of services to clients should also be considered since under a mandatory program a
client who wanted to save money and was willing to bear the risk of employing an uninsured attorney would be prevented from doing so. It is unlikely, however, that the cost of
services to a client would vary greatly between insured and uninsured attorneys.
66. Note 53 and accompanying text supra.
67. W. Gates, supra note 2, at 4. See also text accompanying note 74 infra.
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would also have decreased costs because of the elimination of
advertising expenses, profit margins, brokers' commissions, and
unnecessary reserves .6s
Opponents also maintain that knowing the existence of compulsory coverage will cause people who might not otherwise make
a claim to do SO? Lawyers, they argue, will be less hesitant to
bring actions against other lawyers. The number of increased
claims from these two sources will in turn increase premiums.
The experience of British Columbia has shown that mandatory
coverage may be accompanied by increased claims.'O Even with
an increase in the number of claims, however, lawyers in British
Columbia pay substantially less for insurance than they reportedly would if they had to obtain coverage without a mandatory
program.71 The Oregon State Bar also projects a dramatic
decrease in costs with its mandatory program.72

C. Public Image
The self-imposition of an insurance requirement in recognition of the public interest, it is argued, will improve the bar's
public imagen by making certain that the public will be compensated for attorney malpractice. A bar-imposed mandatory program covering all lawyers will show that attorneys are sincerely
interested in the welfare of their clients and the public.
Pointing to the problem of increased claims caused by public
awareness of insurance coverage, opponents may argue that making malpractice coverage compulsory is a public admission by the
bar that attorneys are often negligent. It seems more probable,
however, that any detrimental effect such an "admission" might
68. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
69. SPECIAL
COMMIT~EE
ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY,
AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE:
FOR THE ORGANIZED
BAR153 (1977).See also
A PRIMER
Johnson, Malpractice: My One-man Battle to Go Bare, MED.ECON.,Feb. 7, 1977, at 120.
70. See Letter from T.V. McCallum to Thomas L. Kay (Oct. 14, 1977) (on file in the
office of the Brighum Young University Law Review). Each state bar may also determine
if establishing a clients' security fund has increased dishonesty claims against lawyers.
71. See id.
72. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
Related to the cost argument is the contention that a client should be permitted to
choose whether to employ an insured or uninsured attorney. In effect, granting the client
such a choice gives him the option of selecting the services of an uninsured lawyer (presumably for a lower fee) and thus bearing the risk of having an unsatisfiable malpractice
claim against his attorney. While such an argument may have some force when the client
is financially sound enough to bear the potential loss, the contention loses its vitality when
poor or nonaffluent clients are involved.
73. W. Gates, supra note 2, a t 2.
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have on the bar's reputation would be more than offset by the
improved public image caused by the indirect showing of concern
for clients' protection made by adoption of a mandatory program.

D.

Malpractice Loss Prevention

As noted above, the administration of a mandatory legal
malpractice insurance program will provide a state bar association with information that will aid in malpractice prevention.
Loss prevention is the best way t o attack the roots of the legal
malpractice problem; information about the causes of losses is
essential to a plan for prevention. Because of the small percentage
of attorneys that have insurance and the fact that insurance companies pool several states together for risk spreading reasons,
there are no accurate figures on the causes of a state's malpractice
problems. Often a large number of claims in State A will have a
direct result on premiums in State B.74
Only under a mandatory program of self-insurance or with
one insurer, it is argued, can a bar effectively discover the causes
of its malpractice problems. One commentator contends, however, that simply involving the bar in claims handling would give
a bar the information it needs.75In Wisconsin, for example, each
attorney policyholder agrees that information about any claim
asserted against him may be reviewed by the bar's insurance
committee. This system allows the bar to compile information on
problem areas and to implement educational programs where
necessary. Proponents argue that, under a mandatory selfinsurance or one-insurer program, premiums can be made to relate directly to a state's own loss experience. As a result of the
direct effect losses would have on premiums, lawyers and bar
associations would be more involved in loss prevention under a
mandatory program than otherwise. British Columbia's experience with a mandatory program is again illustrative. There, the
Law Society, through experience gained in the program's administration, identified the three largest causes of claims and then
worked to remove those causes. The Society devised practical
systems to prevent lawyer negligence and lobbied for changes in
those laws that often caused malpractice problems.
74. For example, "[olne legal malpractice insurer sought the same substantial
premium increase last year [I9761 in Oregon, Washington and Idaho, even though there
had been no claim at all against any of its insured lawyers in Idaho in the preceding year."
Neil, supra note 64, at 5.
75. Stanley, President's Page, 63 A.B.A.J. 155 (1977).
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The variety of possible loss prevention measures extends beyond the British Columbia experiences. One writer has this vision
of other possibilities:
I can see State Bar Journal articles describing case histories
and statistical analyses of causes of losses and, more importantly, checklists and procedures for loss avoidance. I can see
continuing legal education seminars on the subject. I can also
see an increase in the occasions for the consistently careless
lawyer to become involved in his bar's disciplinary processes. In
short, as local loss experience becomes a matter of direct significance to each local lawyer's pocketbook the business of loss
control is going to receive more effective a t t e n t i ~ n . ' ~

These and other measures will be made possible or encouraged by
mandatory insurance and will have positive effects in reducing
the size of the legal malpractice problem.77

E.

Threat of Legislative Enactment

Failure of the bar to require legal malpractice insurance of
its members, it is argued, may result in action by the legislature.
The failure of many doctors to carry coverage has resulted in
several states now requiring doctors to have malpractice insurance in order to pra~tice.'~
If a large number of lawyers continue
to practice law without insurance while the incidence of malpractice suits increases, similar legislation for the legal profession may
well result.7gA legislatively enacted program prompted by the
bar's failure to act is likely to be less favorable to the bar than a
bar-created program. For example, if the legislature simply made
malpractice insurance a requirement of practicing law, there
would be no cost savings or way to identify losses and implement
a loss prevention program. In addition, such legislation would be
accompanied by public attention to the failure of lawyers to protect their clients from negligence and unsatisfied judgments,
thereby resulting in unfavorable publicity for the bar.
76. W. Gates, supra note 2, at 4.
77. All this is not to say that bar associations cannot identify the causes of malpractice without implementing a mandatory insurance program. Because of the larger base of
insureds and the increased amount of bar involvement in program administration, the
identification of sources of malpractice would likely be easier under a mandatory program.
78. See Goldberg, Malpractice: Can the States Outlaw Going Bare?, MED. ECON.,
Dec. 13, 1976, at 31.
79. See also Why the Malpractice Crisis Has to Get Worse to Get Better, MED.ECON.,
Jan. 24, 1977, at 47.
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F. Constitutionality
The constitutionalitys0of a compulsory legal malpractice insurance requirement or program may well be attacked in the
courts. The primary issue would be whether the insurance requirement was an unconstitutional interference with the opportunity of practicing the legal profession. This issue will probably
be resolved in the same way as it has been in the medical context.
Several recent medical malpractice insurance cases demonstrate the reception met by doctors' challenges to insurance requirements. For example, in Pollock v. Methodist Hospital, s1 the
federal district court upheld a hospital requirement that a physician carry malpractice insurance as a condition of his employment a t the hospital. The court dismissed the doctor's due process challenge, observing that the
plaintiff has no liberty or property interest sufficient to invoke
the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the right to practice an occupation is a liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . plaintiff is not
precluded from exercising that right by the insurance requirements of the defendant hospital. He need only comply with the
requirements in order to continue his membership on the hospital staff. . . . This consideration is sufficient to dispose of
plaintiffs possible property interest as

In Jones v. State Board of M e d i ~ i n eboth
, ~ ~ physicians and
hospitals brought an action for declaratory judgment as to the
constitutionality of Idaho's Hospital-Medical Liability Act. The
doctors contended that the Act's malpractice insurance coverage
requirement constituted a denial of due process because it impermissibly deprived them of their constitutional right to pursue a
recognized profession. Although the Idaho Supreme Court agreed
that the pursuit of an occupation was a liberty and property
interest to which the due process protections of the state and
federal constitutions attached, the court stated that the power to
require doctors to carry malpractice insurance was clearly within
the state's police power. The court compared the insurance re80. The validity of the manner of adoption of the mandatory requirement or program
may also be at issue. Because of the wide variations in state laws and procedures regarding
adoption of such an insurance proposal, a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
La. 1975).
81. 392 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.
82. Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
83. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.914 (1977).
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quirement to the bonding requirement of other trades and professions. The court observed that the
requirements of obtaining medical malpractice insurance as a
condition to licensure bear a rational relationship to the health
and welfare of the citizens of the state by providing protection
to patients who may be injured as a result of medical malpractice and to this extent does not violate the guarantees of due
process of laweS4

There has been only one case to date invalidating a mandatory medical malpractice insurance program. In McGuffey v.
the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the Kentucky General Assembly, similar to that of the Idaho Legislature
in Jones, was challenged in two separate declaratory judgment
actions. The court viewed the purpose of the legislation to be
three-fold: (1) to increase the availability of malpractice insurance, (2) to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance, and (3) to
assure that medical malpractice judgments and settlements
would be satisfied. Noting both that the requirement of malpractice coverage did not increase the availability nor reduce the cost
of insurance and that there was no prior history of unsatisfied
claims against doctors or hospitals, the court held, on state (not
federal) constitutional grounds, that the legislation was an unjustified exercise of the state's police powerY
As McGuffey demonstrates, it is possible that, absent proof
of unsatisfied claims and an increase in the availability and reduction in the cost of insurance, legislation that only mandates
insurance coverage for lawyers may be struck down as in conflict
with a state's constitution. Any mandatory program, however,
reasonably related to the accomplishment of its purposes should
satisfy both state and federal constitutional challenges.

G . Conflict of Interest
Arguably, a mandatory program will create a conflict of interest within the bar. The conflict, it is argued, arises as a result
of two factors: (1)the direct effect losses will have on malpractice
premiums, and (2) the bar's interest in keeping down both the
number and size of claims. The mere fact that an attorney is
among the insureds in a self-insured or one-insurer mandatory
program arguably may mean that he has a conflict of interest
84. Id. at 868,555 P.2d at 408.
85. 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky.1977).
86. Id. at 414.
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when involved in prosecuting a legal malpractice case because the
defendant attorney and both counsel would be covered by the
same program or insurer.
However, the fact that the defendant, the defendant's attorney, and the plaintiffs attorney are all covered by the same program or insurer, and nothing more, should not create a substantial ethical problem. Under either a mandatory program or the
presently existing systems, the ethical conflict is too indirect to
be considered a problem in itself. It would be necessary to show
that the plaintiffs counsel, for the purpose of keeping malpractice premiums down by limiting the plaintiff's recovery, had either inadequately represented his client or colluded with the defense counsel.
Indeed, with respect to this possible ethical problem, there
is not a great difference between a mandatory self-insurance or
sole-insurer program and the situation in a legal malpractice case
today. Presently, because of the limited number of malpractice
carriers, there is a good possibility that the defendant lawyer and
attorneys for both sides will be insured, if at all, by the same
company. Even if the defendant lawyer and the attorneys are
each insured by different companies, the overall result may be
similar. This results because a rate increase granted the defendant's insurer to compensate for its large loss may apply to other
insurers as well.

H. Choice of Insurer
Opponents also contend that a mandatory program could
~ ' argument
result in limiting an attorney's choice of i n s ~ r e r .This
is especially forceful where a state bar self-insures or insures with
only one carrier. The choice-of-insurer argument, however, loses
some of its force when applied to new attorneys and other attorneys who are obtaining malpractice insurance for the first time.
Currently only two companies are actively soliciting new business? Thus, there is not a great deal of choice even a t present. If
87. SPECIAL
COMMITTEE
ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY,
supra note 69, at 152.
88. The companies are American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida (generally
through the brokerage of Shand, Morahan & Company, Inc.) and American Home Assurance Company. Id. at 15-16; see T. Sheehan, The History of Lawyers Professional Liability
Insurance 3-4 (Aug. 10, 1977) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the ABA Section
of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law, Showcase Program for Lawyers, Chicago, Illinois). Other companies, however, continue to provide renewal coverage. The
Arkansas, California, Chicago, Florida, and Illinois bar associations have on-going insurance programs with various other insurers. Lloyd's of London will write policies on an
individual risk basis; this type of coverage is most frequently used by the larger law firms.
COMMITTEEON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY,
supra note 69, at 16.
SPECIAL
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a state bar, however, simply requires all attorneys to carry malpractice coverage, rather than requiring participation in a mandatory self-insurance or one-insurer program, such action arguably will create a market and induce more insurers to offer coverage, thereby actually increasing the attorney's choice of insurers.

One of the strongest arguments for requiring legal malpractice insurance is that relating to the financial protection of
clients. Because currently only a low percentage of attorneys
carry adequate malpractice insurance, there is a substantial risk
that clients may suffer unremedied malpractice-caused financial
injurie~.~'
The counterargument is that there is presently no need
for a mandatory insurance program in light of the small number
of unsatisfied judgments against attorney^.^ Attorneys, it is contended, should not be compelled to purchase insurance where
there has been little, if any, evidence of injury to the public.
Lawyers as a profession, however, have a responsibility to act
before there is a public outcry or legislative enactment.
The cost of insurance arguably will be less under a mandatory program. The effect that an increase in the number of attorneys insured will have on the cost of insurance is disputed. The
increased base may reduce the cost by spreading the risk. On the
other hand, including lawyers in the base that are presently uninsured may increase the number of poorer risks and thus increase
the cost. In addition, clients and attorneys may be less hesitant
to sue attorneys for malpractice, knowing that all attorneys are
insured. The experience of the Law Society of British Columbia,
however, indicates that a mandatory program may reduce the
cost of legal malpractice insurance.
Another argument in favor of mandatory insurance is that
loss identification and prevention will be facilitated by a mandatory program. Loss identification and prevention measures, it is
true, can be implemented without imposing an insurance requirement. Nevertheless, these measures will be easier to implement
under a mandatory program. The direct effect a bar's losses will
--

-

89. To the extent that increasing numbers of malpractice claims indicate a greater
incidence of malpractice, the risk to clients may actually be growing.
90. The number of unsatisfied judgments may be a poor indicator of the degree of
public injury caused by attorney malpractice, however. Many injured clients may choose
to bear the loss rather than prosecute a malpractice action to its conclusion. Moreover,
the negotiation process may result in only partial remedies for injured clients who do bring
actions but settle them.
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have on its attorneys' premiums will also be a strong motivator
to make a loss prevention program work.
In light of the increased financial protection afforded clients,
the possible reduction in insurance cost, and the better opportunity to reduce malpractice through loss identification and prevention programs, it seems reasonable to impose a legal malpractice insurance requirement on practicing attorneys.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION
OF A MANDATORY
PROGRAM
Once the decision is made to adopt a mandatory legal malpractice insurance program, a bar association must face some
additional decisions in implementing its program. This section
reviews a few of these decision^.^^

A.

Type of Mandatory Program

Each bar that adopts a mandatory program, as opposed to a
simple insurance requirement, must decide whether to implement it with a commercial carrier or through some other alternat i ~ esuch
, ~ ~as a self-insurance fund as in Oregon or a combination
of self-insurance and commercial insurance as in British Columbia.93Because few insurance companies are currently writing new
legal malpractice policies, a bar association's options may be limited. Added to this limitation is the fact that insurers are apparently unwilling to forego their underwriting discretion as a mandatory program might demand. Representatives of American
Bankers Insurance Company of Florida and American Home Assurance Company, the only two companies writing new policies,
. ~ ~ a mandatory prohave expressed such an u n ~ i l l i n g n e s s Since
91. A bar must also decide on the (1) amount deductible, (2) amount of coverage
required, (3) exclusions from coverage, (4) procedure for enacting the requirement (legislation or supreme court petition), (5) type of coverage (claims made, occurrence, etc.), and
(6) availability of excess coverage over the minimum requirement.
92. SPECIAL
COMMIT~EE
ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY,
supra note 69, at 109;
Fall
Stern & Martin, Solutions to the Attorney Malpractice Insurance Crisis, BARRISTER,
1977, a t 44.
93. Implementation of the British Columbia system in the United States would raise
significant questions of insurance law, particularly if the bar associations had to qualify
as insurance companies under state law. Stanley, supm note 75, a t 155. The Oregon
Professional Liability Fund, i t should be noted, will be exempt from that state's insurance
code. See ORE.REV.STAT.$ 9.080(1) (1977).
94. Telephone interview with Allan Pither, Vice President of American Bankers Insurance Co. of Florida (Oct. 6, 1977) (notes on file in the office of the Brigham Young
University Law Review); telephone interview with Leo J. Gilmartin, Representative of
American Home Assurance Co. (Oct. 5, 1977) (notes on file).
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gram would require that all active members of the bar be able to
obtain coverage from the carrier,95implementation of such a program with a commercial carrier would necessitate overcoming the
companies' hesitancy. It is possible that either company would
alter its position if presented with a program similar to that of
British Columbia with its large deductible feature.
If a commercial carrier will not forego its underwriting discretion, a state bar association will be confronted with a dilemma.
If the bar requires each attorney to carry malpractice insurance,
the insurance companies in effect will be controlling who practices law in that state. An insurance company's decision not to
insure an attorney would effectively bar him from practice. If, as
is probable, the bar association is unwilling to cede that power
to the insurer, it may be impossible to implement a mandatory
program through a commercial carrier.
One alternative to this dilemma is for the bar to self-insure.
Many state bar associations have plans to self-insure or are studying the possibility." The experience of Oregon's self-insuring fund
and those of other states that adopt this alternative will provide
useful information as to the viability of self-insurance.

B. Exemptions
If a mandatory program is instituted, a state bar must also
decide which attorneys will be exempted from the insurance requirement. The plans proposed in Oregon, California, and Washington all suggest decisions different in form but substantially the
same in effect.
Oregon's self-insuring professional liability fund excludes
house counsel, public defenders, legal aid lawyers, and government lawyers. Although patent attorneys are not required to contribute to the fund, they will be required to provide evidence of
similar coverage?' This exception for patent attorneys is based on
their practice's unique nature and on the availability of similar
coverage through a national a s s o ~ i a t i o n . ~ ~
95. SPECIAL
C O M M I ON
~ ELAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY,
supra note 69, at 152.
96. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
As might be expected, some insurance executives do not think self-insurance is a
viable alternative for most bar associations. Telephone interview with Allan Pither, Vice
President of American Bankers Insurance Co. of Florida (Oct. 6, 1977). In Pither's view,
many attorneys and bar associations think there is something "magic" about selfinsurance. Pither also indicates that a bar association needs at least 5,000 members to be
able to self-insure effectively. At present, only 24 associations are over that threshold. See
note 24 supra.
97. Statement of the Board of Governors, supra note 49, at 2.
98. Id.

130

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

The original California proposal, Knox's unamended bill,
excluded attorneys employed by any governmental agency or entity; state, local, or federal officers; and any lawyer representing
only his employer.ggThis employer category would have included
corporations, labor unions, cooperatives, and other similar entities.
Washington's proposed plan basically excluded attorneys
who had no more than one client.loOIn dealing with the problem
of who constitutes a client, the Washington bar decided that
donated legal work for a nonprofit organization would not make
that organization an additional client.
Each program seems to have the same underlying policy, i. e.,
that certain attorneys ;re not generally subject to malpractice
claims and therefore should not be required to carry malpractice
insurance. It does not seem to make much difference whether this
policy is expressed in terms of attorneys not in private practice
or attorneys who have only one client.

C. Bar Defense and Discipline of Insured Attorneys
Another problem, more subtle in nature, may occur under a
mandatory self-insurance program. The problem arises when a
self-insuring bar defends a malpractice claim against one of its
members; in such a situation, the bar may be ethically prohibited
from using information obtained in that defense in a subsequent
disciplinary proceeding against the attorney involved.lo1While
the problem may arise under a voluntary self-insurance program,
it is more likely to occur under a mandatory system.
The problem, however, can be avoided if the bar association
retains outside firms to defend malpractice claims. Information
thus obtained by defense counsel would be protected by the
attorney-client privilege, and its disclosure would violate a disciplinary rule.lo2In order to prevent this problem from arising, a bar
should retain a firm to do its defense work and remind the firm
In addition to excluding certain attorneys, Oregon will also assess new bar members
only one-half of the regular contribution required under the program to be implemented.
Requiring a lower premium of new attorneys appears reasonable in light of the straitened
financial circumstances of most new attorneys.
99. Knox, supra note 54, at 4.
100. W. Gates, supra note 2, at 7.
101. It is likely that more vigorous disciplinary action will be taken against the
consistently careless or incompetent lawyer under a mandatory program. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
102. ABA CODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101(B).
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that it has no duty to reveal to the bar information obtained in
the process of defending malpractice claims.

Legal malpractice and malpractice insurance are serious
problem areas. The cost of malpractice insurance continues to
increase dramatically. As a result attorneys are going without
insurance and more are likely to "go bare" in the future. As more
attorneys practice without insurance coverage, the public stands
a greater chance of suffering an unremediable injury at the hands
of a negligent attorney.
Practicing law is a privilege that carries with it responsibilities. Mandating legal malpractice insurance will help lawyers
protect themselves and the public. Making insurance mandatory
may significantly reduce premiums. More important, however, is
the possibility that loss control programs made possible by a
mandatory program will significantly reduce legal malpractice.
The more directly the bar and its members are involved, the
greater the likelihood of reducing the incidence of legal malpractice.
As each state bar association considers plans for providing
malpractice coverage for its members, serious consideration
should be given to a mandatory program. The benefits of such a
program appear to greatly outweigh the detriments.

Thomas L. Kay

